Facts:

The Dela Cruz sisters were the aunts of Dolores Rongavilla. They borrowed P2,000 from the Rongavillas to have their rooftop repaired. Later, petitioners went back to their aunts to have them sign a contract. Taking advantage of their lack of education, the sisters were made to believe that such document, typewritten in English, was just for the acknowledgment of their debt. After four years, petitioners asked their aunts to vacate the land subject to litigation claiming that she and her husband were the new owners. After verifying with the Registry of Deeds, the aunts were surprised that what they have signed was actually a deed of sale. Their land title was cancelled and the ownership was transferred to their nephews. The land was mortgaged with the Cavite Development Bank.

Issue:

Was the deed of sale void?

Held:

 Yes. More to the point, in our view, is Baranda v. Baranda, 150 SCRA 59 (1987), where this Court found that:

"This Civil Code provides in Article 1391 that an action to annul a contract on the ground of vitiated consent  must be filed within four years from the discovery of the vice of consent. In the instant case, however, we are dealing not with a voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake, undue influence, violence or intimidation that can justify its nullification, but with a contract that is null and void ab initio.

 "Paulina Baranda declared under oath in her complaint that she signed the deeds of sale without knowing what they were, which means that her consent was not merely marred by the above-stated vices, so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all. We are also  satisfied that there was no valid consideration either for the alleged transfers, for reasons already discussed. Lack of consent and consideration made the deeds of sale void altogether and rendered them subject to attack at any time, conformably to the rule in Article 1410 that  an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts 'does not prescribe'."

And if the passage of time could not cure the fatal flaw in the  inexistent and void contract, neither could an alleged ratification or confirmation thereof. Further, as in the case before us, reconveyance is proper. "The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable, hence it cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription. x x x There is no need of an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract; in fact such action cannot logically exist. However, an action to declare the  non-existence of the contract can be maintained; and in the same action, the plaintiff may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract."